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Abstract
Post-production services, such as sales, distribution, and maintenance, comprise a crucial element
of business activity. We explore an international duopoly model in which a foreign ￿rm has the
option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival or providing those services
by establishing its own facilities through FDI. We demonstrate that trade liberalization in goods
may hurt domestic consumers and lower world welfare, and that the negative welfare impacts are
turned into positive ones if service FDI is also liberalized. This ￿nding yields important policy
implications, given the reality that the progress of liberalization in service sectors is still limited.
Keywords:
post-production services, trade liberalization, FDI, outsourcing, international oligopoly
1. Introduction
Business activity does not end with the production of the ￿nal product. After production,
a variety of business activities such as marketing, sales and distribution, and the provision of
maintenance and repair services should be e⁄ectively carried out to maximize the value of products
that have been produced. This is a widely held view in the strategic management literature. Porter
(1985), for example, pointed out that ￿rms￿primary activities can be divided into inbound logistics,
operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service. In Porter￿ s classi￿cation, outbound
logistics means activities associated with collecting, storing, and physically distributing the product
to buyers, marketing and sales means activities associated with providing a means by which buyers
can purchase the product and inducing them to do so, and service means activities associated with
providing service to enhance or maintain the value of the product.
In the present paper, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and service are together referred
to as ￿post-production services.￿A crucial strategic decision that every producer of ￿nal products
needs to make is whether to perform post-production services by itself or outsource (some of) them
to other ￿rms. Since proximity to customers is a crucial element for post-production services, this
decision is particularly important in the context of international trade. Foreign producers often
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tured by foreign auto-makers are often sold and distributed by their local rivals.1 Alternatively,
foreign producers can establish local a¢ liates in the domestic market and perform post-production
services by themselves (foreign direct investment (FDI) in post-production services).2
The objective of this paper is to analyze the provision of post-production services in the context
of international trade and to explore its welfare consequences and policy implications. To this end,
we explore an international duopoly model in which two ￿rms, one domestic and the other foreign,
produce di⁄erentiated products in their own countries and compete in the domestic market. Post-
production services must be performed before a product is consumed.3 The foreign ￿rm has the
option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival by paying royalties or providing
those services by itself in the domestic market. In the latter case, however, the foreign ￿rm must
establish its own service facilities in the domestic market by incurring a ￿xed cost for FDI.4
In our analysis, we take the following aspects of reality into account. Multilateral negotiations
under GATT/WTO have greatly facilitated the liberalization of the trade in goods, and many
countries have committed to maintain low levels of tari⁄ rates. However, with respect to the trade
in services, although the General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) came into e⁄ect in 1995
as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and has been contributing toward expanding
trade in services, the progress is still limited. For instance, Roy et al. (2007) reported that only
52 WTO members had made commitments to liberalizing distribution services under GATS. The
limited progress means that foreign ￿rms may still have to incur substantial extra costs for service
FDI because of regulatory impediments.5 Melitz (2003), for example, pointed out that an exporting
￿rm must set up new distribution channels in the foreign country and conform to all the shipping
rules speci￿ed by the foreign customs agency, and that, although some of these costs cannot be
avoided, others are often manipulated by governments.6;7 When restrictions on service FDI are
high, foreign ￿rms may have to rely on service outsourcing to perform post-production services in
domestic markets. In fact, according to OECD (2001), the number of the non-equity form of new
1In the Japanese market, examples include Volkswagen-Toyota, Ford-Mazda, Volvo-Subaru, and Peugeot-Suzuki,
among others. The following examples are also found in Japan. (i) Several pharmaceutical products produced by
Bayer, a German ￿rm, are sold and distributed by its Japanese rivals, Meiji Seika and Kyorin Pharmaceutical. (ii)
A Japanese liquor company, Suntory, sells wines, beers, whiskies, brandies, liqueurs, and mineral waters made by
foreign companies. (iii) Evian, a mineral water made by French company Danone, is distributed in Japan by a
Japanese beverage company, Calpis. Also, according to Ohmae (1989), in the US pharmaceutical industry, Marion
Laboratories distributes Tanabe￿ s Herbesser and Chugai￿ s Ulcerlmin; Merck distributes Yamanouchi￿ s Gaster; and
Eli Lilly distributes Fujisawa￿ s Cefamezin.
2For example, in the late 1980s a number of foreign auto-makers such as BMW, Chrysler, and Mercedes-Benz
established their own distribution networks in Japan.
3We focus on a class of post-production services that are indispensable for consumption of goods but do not a⁄ect
demand of goods. See Section 2 for details.
4It should be emphasized that our approach is fundamentally di⁄erent from the incomplete contracting approach
which has been recently applied to the analysis of vertical structures in the context of international trade. For details,
see the second last paragraph of this section.
5In his recent study on restrictiveness of FDI, Golub (2003) adopted ￿obligatory screening and approval proce-
dures" and ￿restrictions on foreign ownership￿as two main restrictions, and found that FDI restrictions on business
and distribution services are higher than those on manufacturing.
6Melitz￿ s argument is based on a number of interviews with managers in Colombian ￿rms making export decisions
conducted by Roberts and Tybout (1997).
7In the late 80￿ s, Toysrus￿retail establishment was delayed in Japan because of the Large-scale Retail Store Low.
The United States considered that its application was arbitrary and regarded the low as a typical impediment against
service FDI.
2cross-border alliances in business services increased from 25 in 1989 to 1097 in 2000.
In our framework, the liberalization of the trade in services reduces the ￿xed cost of service FDI,
and the liberalization of the trade in goods reduces the tari⁄. The connection between production
and post-production services, uniquely captured by our model, yields novel welfare consequences
and policy implications as outlined below. Suppose that both the tari⁄ rate and the ￿xed cost
for service FDI are initially high. We demonstrate a possibility that, contrary to the conventional
result, a tari⁄ reduction hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. As in the standard analyses,
the direct e⁄ect of a tari⁄reduction is bene￿cial for consumers and the foreign ￿rm, but is harmful
for the domestic ￿rm. In our framework, however, the domestic ￿rm can mitigate the negative e⁄ect
of a tari⁄ reduction by raising the price it charges the foreign ￿rm for post-production services,
and the higher service price works in the direction of raising goods prices. We show that, from the
welfare standpoint, the latter e⁄ect can overshadow the former e⁄ect so that the tari⁄ reduction
actually hurts consumers and reduces world welfare in equilibrium.
Importantly, if the ￿xed cost for service FDI is also reduced, the domestic ￿rm has less room to
increase the service price in response to the tari⁄ reduction, and a su¢ cient reduction of the ￿xed
cost for service FDI converts the negative welfare e⁄ect of tari⁄ reduction into a positive e⁄ect. In
other words, the liberalization of service FDI can convert a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into
a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. Interestingly, the liberalization of service FDI improves
welfare even when it does not induce the foreign ￿rm to actually undertake service FDI. We believe
that these are important policy implications, given that post-production services consist of an
important subclass of services,8 and that foreign ￿rms￿di¢ culties in undertaking post-production
services in the domestic market have been recently considered to be a serious non-tari⁄ barrier.9
We should mention that we construct a highly stylized model to make our point in a transparent
way. Our model, however, can be extended in a number of ways. For example, non-producers of the
good (or, independent service organizations (ISOs)) sometimes perform post-production services
for goods producers. Our model can incorporate ISOs by assuming that the foreign ￿rm can
outsource services to the domestic ￿rm or one of the ISOs. Also, we can incorporate more than
one domestic ￿rm. We discuss the robustness of our ￿ndings under a number of alternative setups
in Subsection 4.2.
Cross-border transactions of services and FDI in services have been previously studied in the
trade literature.10 Recently, several papers have considered market access and distribution, an
important example of post-production services, in the context of international trade. Richardson
(2004) has shown in a spatial-economy model that the domestic government has an incentive to
open the access to retail distribution to foreign manufacturers when tari⁄s can be used, but it
may limit the access when trade policy is not available. Francois and Wooton (2007) assume
8Browning and Singelmann (1975), for example, classi￿ed services into distribution services, producer services,
social services, and personal services, recognizing distribution services (transport, storage, retail, wholesale trade) as
an important subclass of services.
9For example, in the U.S.-Japan Auto Negotiation in 1995, the U.S. government required the Japanese government
to promote the dealership of imported cars by the domestic car producers. Foreign ￿rms￿pro￿tability will surely
increase if the price they have to pay to outsource post-production services in the local market is reduced. Our
analysis, however, indicates that the liberalization of service FDI is equally or even more important not only for
increasing foreign ￿rms￿pro￿tability but also for bene￿ting domestic consumers and increasing world welfare.
10See, for example, Djaji· c and Kierzkowski (1989), Markusen (1989), Francois (1990), Konan and Maskus (2006),
and Wong et al. (2006) for cross-border transactions of services, and Ra⁄ and von der Ruhr (2001) and Markusen
et al. (2005) for FDI in services.
3that sales of imported goods require the domestic distribution services that are supplied under
imperfect competition. They have shown that trade volumes and the level of optimal tari⁄ are
positively related to the degree of competitiveness in the service sector. In these previous models,
production and distribution of goods are assumed to be conducted in di⁄erent industries. Qiu
(2007) has developed a model to study ￿rms￿incentives to form cross-border strategic alliances
and their choice of entry modes in foreign markets. In his two-country, multi-￿rm model, each
￿rm￿ s cost of distributing its products in the foreign country is assumed to become lower when
the ￿rm forms a strategic alliance with a ￿rm in the foreign country. It should be noted that Qiu
uses the term distribution costs to represent all costs incurred after production, which are costs
for post-production services in our terminology.
Our paper is related to the previous studies mentioned above in the sense that we also investigate
post-production services in the context of international trade. There are, however, some funda-
mental di⁄erences. In our model, the foreign ￿rm determines whether it performs post-production
services by itself or outsources them to its domestic rival. This decision is made under the strategic
interactions between the foreign ￿rm and the domestic ￿rm, and their strategic interactions in the
product market and the provision of post-production services are linked in our model. This linkage,
which is uniquely explored in our analysis, in turn yields novel welfare and policy implications for
the liberalization of both the trade in goods and service FDI. To our knowledge, our analysis is the
￿rst attempt to examine the linkage between FDI in post-production services and product market
competition.
Also, our analysis is distinctively di⁄erent from the incomplete contracting approach that has
been recently applied to the analyses of vertical structures in the context of international trade; see
Antr￿s (2003, 2005); Antr￿s and Helpman (2004); Grossman and Helpman (2004); and Feenstra and
Hanson (2005).11 Their analyses address the choice between vertical integration and the purchase
of a specialized input through contractual outsourcing, where relationship-speci￿c investments
governed by incomplete contracts play a central role. In contrast, as mentioned above, we focus
on the connection between production and post-production services in the context of international
trade, and examine its welfare and policy implications. Given our focus, we do not address relation-
speci￿city of investment and incompleteness of contracting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops an international duopoly
model that captures the linkage between FDI in post-production services and product market
competition, and derives the equilibrium of the model. Section 3 investigates the e⁄ects of the
liberalization of trade in goods, the liberalization of FDI for post-production services, and the
connection between them. Section 4 elaborates on the policy implications of our ￿ndings and
explores the robustness of the results under a number of alternative setups. Section 5 summarizes
the paper and o⁄ers concluding remarks, which include a discussion on the di⁄erence between
post-production services and intermediate inputs in our framework. The Appendix contains proofs
of lemmas and propositions.
2. The Model
Demands in the home country are characterized by a representative consumer who consumes
non-numØraire goods as well as a numØraire good. The non-numØraire goods consist of goods D
11See also Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006) for a recent survey of the literature.
4and F which are imperfect substitutes. The numØraire good is competitively produced and freely
traded between countries. The indirect utility function is given by U (pD;pF;Y ) = V (pD;pF)+Y
where pD and pF are the prices of good D and good F respectively, and Y is the income in the
domestic country.12 Let Vi = @V (pD;pF)=@pi and Vij = @2V (pD;pF)=(@pi@pj) denote the ￿rst
derivative and the second derivative of the subutility function V (pD;pF). We assume Vi < 0,
Vii > 0, and Vij < 0 (i 6= j).
By the Roy￿ s identity, the demand function of good i (i = D;F) is given by xi (pD;pF) = ￿Vi,
where @xi (pD;pF)=@pi = ￿Vii < 0 and @xi (pD;pF)=@pj = ￿Vij > 0 hold. We also assume
jViij > jVijj, which implies that the own-price e⁄ect on demand is larger than the cross-price e⁄ect.
We consider an international duopoly model in which the domestic ￿rm (￿rm D) and the
foreign ￿rm (￿rm F) engage in Bertrand competition in the domestic market. Firm D and ￿rm
F respectively produce good D and good F. The unit cost of producing goods is identical across
￿rms and constant, which is normalized to zero without loss of generality. An ad valorem tari⁄,
t (￿ 0), is imposed on imports of good F. Post-production services must be performed before
a product is consumed. We capture this by assuming that one unit of post-production services
must be performed for one unit of goods to be consumed. Note that we focus on a class of post-
production services that are indispensable for consumption of goods but do not a⁄ect demand of
goods. It includes distribution and certain types of maintenance.13
To perform post-production services, ￿rms must have service facilities in the domestic country.
Assume that ￿rm D has already established its facilities to perform post-production services for
good D in the domestic market. Firm D can also perform post-production services for good F at
the same unit cost cS.14 We assume that post-production services can be performed only by goods
producers (￿rms D and F) because of economy of scope. See Subsection 4.2 for a discussion on an
extension of our model in which independent service organizations can also perform post-production
services for ￿rm F.
Firm F can perform post-production services for good F by itself with the same unit service cost
cS by establishing local facilities for performing post-production services in the domestic market.
We assume that, if ￿rm F undertakes FDI in post-production services, it incurs a ￿xed investment
cost K (￿ 0). Note that the tari⁄ on imports is still e⁄ective even if FDI in post-production
services is made, which is in contrast to ￿tari⁄-jumping￿FDI in production.
In sum, we consider the following two options for ￿rm F to perform post-production services
in the domestic market: (i) Service FDI: Firm F performs post-production services for good F
by incurring a ￿xed cost K to establish its service facilities; or (ii) Service Outsourcing: Firm
F outsources post-production services to ￿rm D, which charges a service price (or royalty) of r
(> 0) per unit of services. We assume K is su¢ ciently low so that ￿rm F can earn positive pro￿t
under service FDI.
12The indirect utility function is derived from a standard quasi-linear utility function given by u(xD;xF;M) =
v(xD;xF) + M where xD and xF denote the consumption of good D and that of good F respectively, and M is the
consumption of the numØraire good.
13For example, systematic provision of maintenance services is indispensable for the usage of photocopiers. The
post-production services which is considered in the paper do not include marketing, because demand of goods tends
to be increasing in intensity of marketing activities.
14We assume that the ￿xed cost for service outsourcing is zero. The qualitative nature of our results remains
unchanged under an alternative setup in which the ￿xed cost must be incurred by ￿rm D and/or ￿rm F. The formal
analysis of this case can be found in the discussion-paper version of the paper (Ishikawa et al., 2008). See also
Subsection 4.2 for a discussion.
5We can express the operating pro￿ts of the two ￿rms (i.e., the pro￿t gross of the ￿xed cost) as





￿ (1 ￿ ￿)cS ￿ ￿r
￿
xF(pD;pF); (2)
where ￿ is the parameter which takes ￿ = 1 if ￿rm F outsources post-production services to
￿rm D and ￿ = 0 if it chooses FDI in post-production services. Consumer surplus and domestic
welfare are respectively given by CS(pD;pF) ￿ V (pD;pF)￿Y and W(pD;pF) ￿ CS(pD;pF)+￿D+
tpFxF(pD;pF)=(1+t) where the last term of W(pD;pF) represents tari⁄revenues. World welfare is
given by WW(pD;pF) ￿ W(pD;pF)+￿F ￿(1 ￿ ￿)K. Note that world welfare includes ￿(1 ￿ ￿)K
since the ￿xed cost of service FDI reduces the net pro￿t of ￿rm F. Since @CS(pD;pF)=@pi = Vi < 0,
an increase in pi hurts consumers. With respect to world welfare, since @WW(pD;pF)=@pi =
[pi ￿ cS](@xi=@pi) + [pj ￿ cS](@xj=@pi) (i 6= j), an increase in pi also lowers world welfare unless
pj > pi holds and the magnitude of the cross-price e⁄ect is su¢ ciently close to that of the own-price
e⁄ect.15 To simplify the analysis, we consider the case where both @WW(pD;pF)=@pD < 0 and
@WW(pD;pF)=@pF < 0 hold in equilibrium.16
We consider a three-stage game. The timing of the game is as follows.
[Stage 1]: Firm D determines whether to o⁄er a service price of r (> 0).
[Stage 2]: If r is o⁄ered, ￿rm F determines whether to accept the o⁄er.17 We assume that,
if ￿rm F accepts the o⁄er, it commits to outsourcing all post-production services for good F in
the domestic market. Under this assumption, we can treat two options ￿service FDI and service
outsourcing ￿as distinctive alternatives. If ￿rm F rejects the o⁄er, or if ￿rm D does not o⁄er r in
Stage 1, ￿rm F undertakes FDI in post-production services.
[Stage 3]: Firms D and F simultaneously set prices of their own products, and then consumers
make purchase decisions. We assume ￿D and ￿F are supermoduler in prices so that the prices are
strategic complements.
For expositional simplicity, we adopt the following tie-breaking rules: (i) If ￿rm F is indi⁄erent
between accepting and rejecting a service price r o⁄ered by ￿rm D at stage 1, ￿rm F accepts it.
(ii) If ￿rm D is indi⁄erent between o⁄ering and not o⁄ering r, ￿rm D does not o⁄er it.
2.1. Product market competition
In this subsection, we derive the equilibria of Stage-3 subgames. The game has two Stage-3
subgames depending on decisions made at Stage 2: (i) FDI subgame: Firm F undertakes FDI
15By substituting CS(pD;pF), (1), and (2) into WW(pD;pF), world welfare becomes WW(pD;pF) =
V (pD;pF) ￿ Y + [pD ￿ cS]xD(pD;pF) + [pF ￿ cS]xF(pF;pD) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K. Since Vi = ￿xi(pD;pF) holds, we have





i[pi ￿ cS]f(@xi=@pi) + (@xj=@pi)] < 0, @WW(pD;pF)=@pi > 0 and
@WW(pD;pF)=@pj > 0 (i 6= j) never hold at the same time. Even if @WW(pD;pF)=@pi > 0 (i = D or F) holds in
equilibrium, the main results of the paper would remain unchanged. That is, a tari⁄ reduction deteriorates world
welfare under a range of parameterizations, and a su¢ cient reduction of the ￿xed cost for service FDI converts
the negative welfare e⁄ect of tari⁄ reduction into a positive e⁄ect. The analysis, however, becomes much more
complicated and results on world welfare presented in Lemma 1, Propositions 2 and 4 need some adjustments. See
the Appendix for details.
17We simplify the analysis by assuming that the equilibrium level of r is determined by ￿rm D￿ s take-it-or-leave-it
service price o⁄er. See Subsection 4.2 for a discussion on the robustness of our results under more general bargaining
procedures in which the two ￿rms share the surplus from service outsourcing.
6in post-production services at Stage 2; (ii) Outsourcing (OS) subgame: ￿rm F outsources
post-production services to ￿rm D at Stage 2.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that the market size for each good is large enough and the
tari⁄ rate t is small enough so that each ￿rm i (= D, F) sells a strictly positive amount of good i
in the domestic market in equilibrium. We also assume that the game has a unique equilibrium in
the entire range of relevant parameterizations.
2.1.1. FDI subgame
Let us begin with the FDI subgame, in which ￿ = 0 applies in (1) and (2). In the third stage,






















Denote the equilibrium prices in the FDI subgame as e pD (cS;t) and e pF (cS;t). The producer price
of good F is given by e pF (cS;t)=(1 + t). By substituting these prices into the demand functions,
the equilibrium sales are given by e xD (cS;t) and e xF (cS;t). The equilibrium operating pro￿ts in
the FDI subgame are given by
e ￿D (cS;t) = [e pD (cS;t) ￿ cS]e xD (cS;t); (5)






e xF (cS;t): (6)
2.1.2. OS subgame
Next turn to the OS subgame, where ￿ = 1 applies in equations (1) and (2). In the third stage,
each ￿rm maximizes its pro￿t with respect to its price given the service price, r, set by ￿rm D in
the ￿rst stage. The ￿rst-order conditions become
@￿D
@pD
= xD(pD;pF) + [pD ￿ cS]
@xD(pD;pF)
@pD


















By solving these equations, we ￿nd the equilibrium prices in the OS subgame as b pD (r;t) and
b pF (r;t). We obtain the following lemma (see Appendix for the proof).
Lemma 1. In the equilibrium of the OS subgame, a rise in the service price increases the prices
of both goods and reduces the consumer surplus and world welfare, holding the tari⁄ rate ￿xed.
The logic behind the lemma can be explained as follows. Given ￿rm F￿ s price and the tari⁄
rate, an increase in the service price raises ￿rm D￿ s pro￿t-margin from service outsourcing. This
in turn makes ￿rm D more willing to raise pD so that xF(pD;pF) increases. As a result, ￿rm D￿ s
optimal price increases in its service price, r. Besides that, given ￿rm D￿ s price and the tari⁄
rate, ￿rm F￿ s optimal price increases in its marginal cost, r. Since the prices of the two goods are
7strategic complements, the incentives to raise prices for both ￿rms lead to higher prices for both
￿rms.
By substituting b pD (r;t) and b pF (r;t) into the demand functions, the equilibrium sales are given
by b xD (r;t) and b xF (r;t). Then, the equilibrium pro￿ts of ￿rms are respectively expressed as







b xF (r;t): (10)
Before discussing the equilibrium of the entire game, the following property is worth noting.
Lemma 2. If r = cS, b pi (r;t) = e pi (cS;t), b xi(r;t) = e xi(cS;t), and b ￿i(r;t) = e ￿i(cS;t) (i = fD;Fg)
are satis￿ed.
When r = cS, the third-term of (7) disappears, and the ￿rst-order conditions in the OS subgame
coincide with those in the FDI subgame. This implies that the equilibrium outcomes in both
subgames become the same.
2.2. Firm F￿ s decision
In this subsection, we discuss ￿rm F￿ s choice between service outsourcing and service FDI. If
￿rm F does not accept r o⁄ered by ￿rm D (or if ￿rm D does not o⁄er any service price), then ￿rm
F￿ s equilibrium pro￿t in the subsequent FDI subgame is e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K, which is independent of
r. If ￿rm F accepts the o⁄er, its equilibrium pro￿t in the subsequent OS subgame is b ￿F(r;t). Let
b ￿0
i;r(r;t) ￿ @b ￿i(r;t)=@r (i = D;F). Using the envelope theorem, we have
b ￿0











The ￿rst term, which is negative, represents the direct e⁄ect of an increase in the service price
on ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. The second term, which is positive,
represents the strategic e⁄ect meaning that a higher r induces a higher pD, which in turn increases
the demand for good F and then increases ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t.
For expositional simplicity, we focus on the case in which the direct e⁄ect dominates the indirect
e⁄ect so that b ￿0
F;r(r;t) < 0 holds for all relevant r, which is true under linear demand functions
for example. Analogous assumptions are typically made in the literature that considers price
competition in a di⁄erentiated-oligopoly model (see Ordover et al., 1990; Chen, 2001; Chen et al.,
2004, for instance).18 Given b ￿0
F;r(r;t) < 0 for all r, there exists a unique ￿ r (> 0) such that
b ￿F(￿ r;t) = e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K: (12)
We have b ￿F(r;t) < e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K for all r > ￿ r, and hence ￿ r is the maximum acceptable service
price from ￿rm F￿ s standpoint.19 If evaluated at r = cS, we have b ￿F(r;t) ￿ e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K with
18We can verify that if @b pD (r;t)=@r ￿ 1, b ￿
0
F;r(r;t) < 0 always holds. For instance, when demand functions are
linear, @b pD (r;t)=@r < 1 necessarily holds. If @b pD (r;t)=@r > 1, on the other hand, we can verify that b ￿
0
F;r(r;t) < 0
holds if @xF=@pD is su¢ ciently small. See Appendix for details.
19If b ￿
0
F;r(r;t) < 0 does not hold for some r, our results remain mostly unchanged as long as there exists a value
r
0 > 0 such that b ￿F(r
0;t) = e ￿F(cS;t)￿K and b ￿F(r;t) < e ￿F(cS;t)￿K for all r > r
0. However, the analysis becomes
complicated without providing new insights.
8equality if K = 0 (see Lemma 2). This implies that ￿ r > cS holds if K > 0 and ￿ r = cS holds if
K = 0. The determination of ￿ r is depicted in Figure 1, where the horizontal axis is the level of the
service price and the downward-sloping curve represents b ￿F(r;t). At r = cS, b ￿F(r;t) = e ￿F(cS;t)
holds and ￿ r is determined to satisfy b ￿F(￿ r;t) = e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K. It is easy to con￿rm by the ￿gure
that ￿ r > cS holds as long as K > 0 and ￿ r approaches cS as K approaches zero (see Lemma 5
below).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Let K denote the ￿xed cost such that e ￿F(cS;t) = K holds. We assume K < K which implies
e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K > 0, and hence b ￿F(￿ r;t) > 0. This in turn implies that each ￿rm i (= D, F) sells a
strictly positive amount of good i in the domestic market in the equilibrium of the OS subgame
for all r 2 [cS; ￿ r].
2.3. Equilibrium of the entire game
We now derive the equilibrium of the entire game. The equilibrium is either an Outsourc-
ing (OS) equilibrium in which ￿rm F outsources post-production services to ￿rm D, or an FDI
equilibrium in which ￿rm F undertakes FDI in post-production services. Using the envelope the-
orem, we have the e⁄ect of an increase in r on ￿rm D￿ s equilibrium pro￿t in the OS subgame,
b ￿0




fb pD(r;t) ￿ cSg
@b xD(r;t)
@pF







An increase in r raises the price of good F. An increase in pF in turn increases the sales of good D
and bene￿ts ￿rm D, but it decreases the sales of good F and reduces the pro￿t from performing
post-production services for ￿rm F. These e⁄ects are represented in the ￿rst term of the above
equation. An increase in r also raises the per-unit pro￿t from post-production services, which is
represented in the second term of the equation.
It is straightforward to show that b ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0 holds for r ￿ cS. For r > cS, b ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0
holds only if the di⁄erence between r and cS is not too large. In what follows, we focus our
analysis on the case in which ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0 holds for all r 2 (cS; ￿ r]. This condition is imposed for
expositional simplicity. Under this condition, if ￿rm D o⁄ers its service price so that the o⁄er is
accepted by ￿rm F, ￿rm D o⁄ers the maximum acceptable price r = ￿ r. If it does not hold, then
￿rm D sets r < ￿ r in the equilibrium, but our main results would remain unchanged (see Subsection
4.2 for details).
Proposition 1 below characterizes the equilibrium of the entire game.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium of the entire game is an OS equilibrium if K > 0 and an FDI
equilibrium if K = 0.
Since ￿rm D incurs no ￿xed costs to provide ￿rm F with post-production services, its pro￿t in
the equilibrium of the OS subgame is no worse than those in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame
as long as r ￿ cS. If K > 0, we have r > cS and so b ￿D (r;t) > e ￿D (cS;t) holds. In this case, ￿rm D
o⁄ers r which ￿rm F accepts, and the equilibrium of the entire game becomes an OS equilibrium.
If K = 0, on the other hand, we have r = cS and so b ￿D (r;t) = e ￿D (cS;t) holds by Lemma 2.
Hence, ￿rm D does not o⁄er r and the equilibrium of the entire game becomes an FDI equilibrium.
9If we introduce a ￿xed cost of service outsourcing which ￿rm D must incur, the equilibrium of the
entire game can be an FDI equilibrium even with positive K. Our results would remain unchanged
under this alternative setup (see Subsection 4.2 for details).
3. Liberalization of goods trade and service FDI
This section investigates the e⁄ects of the liberalization of trade in goods, the liberalization
of FDI for post-production services, and the connection between them. In our analysis, the trade
liberalization is represented by a reduction in the tari⁄rate, t, and the liberalization of service FDI
is represented by a reduction in the ￿xed cost of service FDI, K. Let t0 2 (0;￿ t] denote the tari⁄
rate before the trade liberalization, and K0 2 (0;K) denote the ￿xed cost of service FDI before
the liberalization of service FDI. Note that proofs of lemmas and propositions are presented in the
Appendix.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the trade liberalization of goods has recently made sub-
stantial progress through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, while the progress of the
liberalization in service sectors has been slow so far. Given this, we ￿rst investigate the e⁄ects of
tari⁄ reduction, holding K ￿xed at the pre-liberalization level, K0. We then investigate the e⁄ects
of the liberalization of service FDI, showing that the liberalization of service FDI can convert a
welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. We also show
that, holding the tari⁄rate ￿xed, the liberalization of service FDI unambiguously improves welfare.
We ￿rst investigate the e⁄ects of the trade liberalization on the service price in the outsourcing
equilibrium. Let ￿ r(t) denote the equilibrium service price as a function of t, and consider the
e⁄ect of a tari⁄ reduction from t to t ￿ ￿. We ￿nd that ￿ r(t) < ￿ r(t ￿ ￿) holds (that is, the trade
liberalization increases the equilibrium service price), if b ￿F(￿ r(t);t￿￿) > e ￿F(cS;t￿￿)￿K holds.
Under this condition, the tari⁄ reduction increases ￿rm F￿ s equilibrium pro￿t more in the OS
subgame than in the FDI subgame. Then, ￿rm D can absorb this gap by increasing the service
price from ￿ r(t) to ￿ r(t ￿ ￿) so that ￿rm F becomes indi⁄erent between FDI and OS (that is,
b ￿F(￿ r(t ￿ ￿);t ￿ ￿) = e ￿F(cS;t ￿ ￿) ￿ K holds).
The idea mentioned above can be formalized as follows. Firm F￿ s pro￿t is b ￿F(r;t) in the
equilibrium of the OS subgame and e ￿F(cS;t)￿K in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. At Stage
1, ￿rm D charges the service price r = ￿ r at which ￿rm F is indi⁄erent between outsourcing and
not outsourcing post-production services. Hence, for any given K 2 (0;K), ￿ r is determined by











F;t (cS;t) ￿ @e ￿F (cS;t)=@t and b ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ @b ￿F (cS;t)=@t. Given b ￿0
F;r (r;t) < 0, the
following lemma is immediate from (13).
Lemma 3. In the OS equilibrium, dr=dt < 0 holds if and only if e ￿0
F;t (cS;t)￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) > 0 holds.
Lemma 3 says that a reduction in tari⁄ raises the equilibrium service price if and only if
10e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) > 0 holds. Using (6) and (10), we ￿nd
e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t)
=
































Note that e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) > 0 holds if a tari⁄ increase reduces ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t more in the
equilibrium of the OS subgame than in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame, holding the service
price in the OS subgame ￿xed at r = ￿ r.
Let us ￿rst hold prices and quantities ￿xed, and consider the direct e⁄ect of a tari⁄ increase
on the di⁄erence of ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t in the two types of equilibrium. This e⁄ect is captured by the
￿rst term of the RHS of (14). A tari⁄ increase results in a decrease in ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t, where the
decrement of ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t is the same as the decrement of ￿rm F￿ s revenue. In the equilibrium
of the OS subgame with the service price r = ￿ r, ￿rm F￿ s unit cost of production is ￿ r, which is
greater than its unit cost cS in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. The higher unit cost works
in the direction of making ￿rm F￿ s revenue smaller in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. At
the same time, however, service outsourcing induces ￿rm D to charge a higher price to goods D
so that ￿rm F can sell more, because ￿rm D can make pro￿t from selling services to ￿rm F. In
other words, service outsourcing weakens the degree of product market competition. This e⁄ect
works in the direction of making ￿rm F￿ s revenue greater in the equilibrium of the OS subgame.
When the latter e⁄ect dominates the former, ￿rm F￿ s revenue is higher in the equilibrium of the
OS subgame than in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. In such cases, an increase in the ad
valorem tari⁄ reduces ￿rm F￿ s revenue more in the OS subgame than in the FDI subgame holding
prices and quantities ￿xed, implying that the sign of the direct e⁄ect is positive. We verify in the
proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix that the direct e⁄ect is indeed positive under a range of
parameterizations in the linear demand system.
Next consider the strategic e⁄ect of a tari⁄ increase, which is captured by the second term of
the RHS of (14). A tari⁄ increase induces an increase in ￿rm D￿ s price, which in turn induces
￿rm F to produce more.20 The strategic e⁄ect increases ￿rm F￿ s equilibrium pro￿t, where the
increment can be either larger or smaller in the OS subgame than in the FDI subgame. Hence the
sign of the second term can also be positive or negative.
The sign of e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) is positive if the direct e⁄ect and the strategic e⁄ect are
both positive. Even if the strategic e⁄ect is negative, e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) > 0 still holds if
the direct e⁄ect is su¢ ciently positive. We have found, using the linear demand system, that
e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) > 0 holds in a range of parameterizations (see the proof of Proposition 2 in
the Appendix).21




F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿
0
F;t (r;t) > 0 may still hold even if the direct e⁄ect is negative, it can be shown that
the direct e⁄ect has to be positive for e ￿
0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿
0
F;t (r;t) to be positive under the linear demand. Suppose
11Next we consider the e⁄ects of the trade liberalization on the equilibrium goods prices. Suppose
that the trade liberalization decreases the equilibrium service price (that is, suppose that dr=dt >
0 holds). Then the liberalization unambiguously reduces ￿rm F￿ s costs, and the lower service
price means that the degree of product market competition becomes tougher. All these elements
imply that the trade liberalization decreases the equilibrium prices of goods D and F, and this in
turn implies that the trade liberalization increases consumer surplus and world welfare. However,
dr=dt < 0 can hold as mentioned above. If the trade liberalization increases the equilibrium service
price, then its e⁄ects on the equilibrium goods prices become ambiguous. We obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 4. Holding K ￿xed at K0, there exist unique critical values ￿D < 0 and ￿F < 0 such that




holds, where i = D, F.
Lemma 4 tells us that the trade liberalization of goods increases the equilibrium goods price(s)












A tari⁄decrease directly reduces ￿rm F￿ s cost and this works in the direction of reducing the equi-
librium goods prices (i.e., @b pi(r;t)=@t > 0). However, if dr=dt < 0, an induced increase in the ser-
vice price works in the direction of increasing the equilibrium goods prices (i.e., @b pi(r;t)=@r(dr=dt) <
0) since it raises ￿rm F￿ s cost and also weakens the degree of product market competition. The
former direct e⁄ect is dominated by the latter induced e⁄ect if dr=dt is su¢ ciently negative, im-
plying that the trade liberalization increases the equilibrium goods price(s). More speci￿cally, if
dr=dt < ￿f@b pi(r;t)=@tg=f@b pi(r;t)=@rg ￿ ￿i, the trade liberalization of goods increases the price
of good i (see the proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix).
Lemma 4 indicates that, if K is ￿xed at K0, a tari⁄reduction may harm consumers and reduce
world welfare by increasing the equilibrium consumer prices. Proposition 2 formalizes this by
investigating how the trade liberalization of goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of FDI
for post-production services, a⁄ects consumers, world welfare, and ￿rms￿pro￿tability. In what
follows, let CS(K;t), WW(K;t), ￿D(K;t), and ￿F(K;t); respectively, denote consumer surplus,
world welfare, ￿rm D￿ s pro￿t, and ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t in the equilibrium of the entire game.
Proposition 2. Holding K ￿xed at K0, there exists a range of parameterizations in which a tar-
i⁄ reduction hurts consumers, deteriorates world welfare, and bene￿ts ￿rm D. More precisely,
@CS(K0;t)=@t > 0, @WW(K0;t)=@t > 0, and @￿D(K0;t)=@t < 0 hold if dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F] holds
and only if dr=dt < max[￿D;￿F] holds. Under a range of parameterizations, dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F]
holds.
that the demand function for good i is linear and given by xi(pD;pF) = a ￿ pi + bpj (i;j 2 fD;Fg; i 6= j),
where a (> 0) and b 2 [0;1) respectively represent the market size and the substitutability of the two products.
We can verify that there exists a value b
0 2 (0;1) such that the direct e⁄ect in the RHS of (14) takes a negative
value and hence e ￿
0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿
0
F;t (r;t) ￿ 0 holds for any b 2 [0;b
0]. This means that b 2 (b
0;1) is necessary for
e ￿
0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿
0
F;t (r;t) > 0 to hold. That is, dr=dt < 0 would hold only in the market where products are not highly
di⁄erentiated and ￿rms compete with each other relatively intensely.
12Proposition 2 tells us that a tari⁄ reduction necessarily harms consumers, deteriorates world
welfare, and bene￿ts ￿rm D, if it increases the equilibrium prices of both goods D and F (that
is, if dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F]). Note that this condition is su¢ cient but not necessary. The negative
welfare e⁄ects may persist when a tari⁄ reduction increases at least one of the goods prices (that
is, if dr=dt < max[￿D;￿F]). As shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix, dr=dt <
min[￿D;￿F] holds under a range of parameterizations in a linear demand system.
How can the negative impacts of tari⁄ reduction be resolved? We address this question by
exploring the connection between the trade liberalization of goods and the liberalization of service
FDI.
Proposition 3. Take any parameterization in which @CS(K;t0)=@t > 0 and @WW(K;t0)=@t > 0
hold for some K. There exists a unique KCS 2 (0;K] such that @CS(K;t0)=@t < 0 hold for all K 2
(0;KCS), and a unique KWW 2 (0;K] such that @WW(K;t0)=@t < 0 hold for all K 2 (0;KWW).
Suppose CS(K;t0)=@t > 0 and @WW(K;t0)=@t > 0 hold, so that a tari⁄ reduction at t = t0
hurts consumers and decreases world welfare. Proposition 2 tells us that these conditions hold
under a range of parameterizations in which d￿ r=dt is su¢ ciently negative. Proposition 3 says
that these negative e⁄ects of the tari⁄ reduction disappear and turn into positive ones when K is
reduced to a su¢ ciently low level by the liberalization of service FDI. Lemma 5 below is useful to
understand the logic behind Proposition 3.
Lemma 5. The equilibrium service price ￿ r is strictly increasing in K for all K 2 (0;K).
Recall that the equilibrium service price is determined by the condition b ￿F (r;t) = e ￿F (cS;t)￿
K (equation (12)), where ￿rm F is indi⁄erent between service outsourcing and FDI. Firm F￿ s
equilibrium pro￿t in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame, e ￿F (cS;t)￿K, is decreasing in K. Then,
since b ￿F (r;t) is decreasing in r, ￿rm D can charge a higher price for the post-production services
as K increases, resulting in the lemma.
The liberalization of service FDI decreases K, which in turn reduces the equilibrium service
price ￿ r. As K approaches zero, ￿ r approaches cS. Recall d￿ r=dt = [e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t)]=b ￿0
F;r (r;t)
(see equation (13)). As ￿ r approaches cS, the numerator e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) approaches zero
while the denominator approaches e ￿0
F;r (cS;t) < 0. Hence, d￿ r=dt approaches zero as ￿ r approaches
cS, implying that the impact of the induced change in service price becomes negligible if K becomes
su¢ ciently small.
However, since the direct e⁄ect of trade liberalization always reduces the goods prices (i.e.,
@b pi(r;t)=@t > 0), ￿i = ￿f@b pi(r;t)=@tg=f@b pi(r;t)=@rg (< 0) does not approach zero as ￿ r approaches
cS. Then, when K is reduced to a su¢ ciently low level, d￿ r=dt becomes su¢ ciently close to zero
so that dr=dt < max[￿D;￿F] does not hold any more. Equation (16) then implies that we can
always ￿nd a unique positive cut-o⁄ level of the ￿xed cost below which the direct e⁄ect of trade
liberalization necessarily dominates the induced increase in the service price and so a tari⁄reduction
always decreases the prices of both goods. More speci￿cally, let b K > 0 and b K0(> b K) denote the
smallest level of K such that dr=dt = max[￿D;￿F] and dr=dt = min[￿D;￿F] hold respectively.
Trade liberalization increases the prices of both goods if K > b K0 holds and decreases them if
K < b K holds. Figure 2 graphically represents these changes given that dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F] holds
at K = K0.22
22Figure 2 is depicted by using linear demands. With linear demands, we have the following properties: (i)
13[Insert Figure 2 around here]
Proposition 3 then tells us that the negative welfare e⁄ects of tari⁄ reduction disappears and
turns into positive ones when K is reduced to a su¢ ciently low level.23 In other words, when the
di⁄erence between r and cS is su¢ ciently reduced by lowering K (see Lemma 5 and Figure 1), the
e⁄ect of tari⁄ reduction on ￿rm F￿ s equilibrium pro￿t in the OS subgame gets closer to the one in
the FDI subgame. This in turn implies that there is less room for ￿rm D to raise the service price
in response to the reduction in tari⁄, turning the negative welfare e⁄ects of tari⁄ reduction into
positive ones. This is what Proposition 3 says. Interestingly, the liberalization of service FDI can
convert a welfare-reducing tari⁄ reduction into a welfare-enhancing tari⁄ reduction even though
the reduction in K does not induce ￿rm F to actually invest in service FDI in equilibrium as long
as K > 0.
Finally, we explore the e⁄ect of the liberalization of service FDI, holding the tari⁄ rate ￿xed.
As shown in the Appendix, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For any given t, CS(K;t), WW(K;t), and ￿F(K;t) are decreasing in K while
￿D(K;t) is increasing in K for all K 2 (0;K]:
A decrease in K reduces the equilibrium service price r (see Lemma 5), and hence ￿rm F￿ s
costs become lower, resulting in an increase in its pro￿t. The lower service price also means that
the degree of product market competition becomes tougher. Both of these elements imply that the
liberalization of service FDI increases consumer surplus and world welfare, while it decreases ￿rm
D￿ s equilibrium pro￿t. It is interesting, again, to note that a reduction in K yields pro-competitive
consequences even though the reduction in K does not induce ￿rm F to actually invest in service
FDI in the equilibrium as long as K > 0.
Firm F undertakes service FDI when K = 0. As Proposition 5 below tells us, when the
liberalization of service FDI reduces K down to zero, any tari⁄ reduction has positive welfare
e⁄ects.
Proposition 5. Under an FDI equilibrium, a tari⁄ reduction necessarily bene￿ts consumers, hurts
￿rm D, and improves world welfare. More precisely, @CS (K;t)=@t < 0, @￿D (K;t)=@t > 0, and
@WW (K;t)=@t < 0 hold when K = 0.
It should be noted that a reduction of cS also decreases r. As a ￿nal point to this section,
therefore, we compare a reduction of K with a reduction of cS regarding their e⁄ects on resolving
the negative impacts of tari⁄ reductions. As shown in Proposition 3, a su¢ cient reduction of K
converts a welfare-reducing tari⁄ reduction into a welfare-enhancing tari⁄ reduction. A reduction
of K increases ￿rm F￿ s pro￿t in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame, e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K, and this in
turn decreases the equilibrium service price r that is determined by b ￿F (r;t) = e ￿F (cS;t) ￿ K. As
K approaches zero, r approaches cS and so e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) approaches zero. Hence there
always exist strictly positive cut-o⁄ values of K such that a reduction of K below these values
converts a welfare-reducing tari⁄ reduction into a welfare-enhancing tari⁄ reduction.
￿F < ￿D, (ii) ￿i is decreasing in K, (iii) dr=dt < 0 can hold only if (dr=dt)jK=0 < 0 holds, (iv) dr=dt is U-shaped in
K given (dr=dt)jK=0 < 0. Note that these properties are not necessary for Proposition 3.
23More precisely, Proposition 3 says that we can always ￿nd unique K
CS and K
WW in K 2 [ b K; b K
0). See the proof
of the proposition for details.
14Since a reduction of cS also increases e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K, it has an e⁄ect similar to the e⁄ect of
reduction of K mentioned above.24 However, there is a di⁄erence between these e⁄ects. Although
a reduction of cS reduces r as a reduction of K does, r does not approach cS when cS approaches
zero, and hence e ￿0
F;t (cS;t) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) does not approach zero as cS approaches zero. Therefore,
even if cS is reduced to zero, a welfare-reducing tari⁄ reduction is not necessarily converted into a
welfare-increasing tari⁄ reduction, while a su¢ cient reduction of K necessarily accomplishes such
a conversion.
4. Discussion
When a foreign ￿rm outsources post-production services to its domestic rival ￿rm, the liber-
alization of trade in goods could raise the price for service outsourcing. The rise in the service
price could hurt consumers and reduce world welfare by inducing goods prices to rise. We have
demonstrated a possibility that the liberalization of trade in goods generates negative welfare ef-
fects in our framework. We have then shown that the liberalization of service FDI converts a
welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. In this section,
we ￿rst discuss the policy implications of our results, and then explore the robustness of our results
under alternative modelling choices.
4.1. Policy implications
Through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, countries have been lowering the bar-
riers for the trade in goods. Growing attention is now being paid to the market access of foreign
￿rms in the service sector. The GATT Uruguay Round negotiations succeeded in establishing the
framework of liberalizing cross-country transactions of services, that is, the GATS. The actual de-
gree of liberalization, however, has been relatively small. For instance, Roy et al. (2007) reported
that only 52 WTO members had made commitments to liberalizing distribution services under
GATS. Under the limited progress of liberalization in the service sector, many foreign ￿rms still
face signi￿cantly high costs for service FDI, which prevent them from establishing local service
facilities to perform post-production services by themselves in the local market.
In our theoretical framework, the current state of the world corresponds to a situation in
which the tari⁄ rate t is reduced to a reasonably low level but the ￿xed cost for service FDI,
K, is still high. The liberalization of trade in goods bene￿ts consumers and enhances world
welfare if it lowers the price for service outsourcing. Our analysis suggests, however, that policy
makers should carefully access the e⁄ects of the trade liberalization if it raises the service price.
In particular, if the rise in the service price induces the prices of both goods D and F to rise,
the trade liberalization necessarily harms consumers and deteriorates world welfare. Our analysis
uncovers a previously unnoticed importance of the liberalization of service FDI in its connection
to the trade liberalization by showing that a su¢ ciently large reduction of the ￿xed cost for service
FDI converts a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into a welfare-enhancing trade liberalization.
That is, the liberalization of service FDI is important not only because it reduces per-unit costs of
post-production services but also because it recovers the gains from the trade liberalization of goods
for both consumers and world welfare. Therefore, making progress on the liberalization of service
24As is the e⁄ect of r on ^ ￿F(r;t), we focus on the situation where the direct e⁄ect of the cost increase dominates
the strategic e⁄ect so that @e ￿F(cS;t)=@cS < 0 holds.
15FDI under GATS is crucial to secure positive welfare consequences of the trade liberalization under
GATT/WTO.
Recently, many regional trade agreements (RTAs) have established codes for the liberalization
in the service sector in addition to those for the liberalization of the trade in goods. In these
RTAs, some countries have undertaken further commitments on the liberalization of FDI in post-
production services on top of the existing GATS commitments. For instance, in its RTA with
Australia, Thailand allows Australian ￿rms 100% foreign equity ownership for distribution of their
products, even though it limits foreign equity ownership up to 49% in its GATS distribution
commitments.25 Singapore made broader commitments on the retailing of certain goods in its RTAs
with the US, Australia, and Korea. Our analysis indicates that RTAs with deeper commitments
towards the liberalization of service FDI are more likely to make the trade liberalization pro-
competitive, suggesting that the recent proliferation of RTAs may be superior to the multilateral
liberalization under GATT/WTO.
We end this subsection by commenting on horizontal FDI. Since horizontal FDI in production
to serve the local market ￿ jumps￿tari⁄s, it has the same e⁄ect as a tari⁄elimination. In our model,
the tari⁄ elimination may hurt consumers and reduce world welfare if it is not accompanied by
the liberalization of service FDI. Our ￿ndings therefore indicate that, to secure its positive welfare
consequences, the liberalization of FDI in production should be accompanied by the liberalization
of service FDI.
4.2. Robustness
Bargaining power: The assumption that ￿rm D makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er gives ￿rm D all
the bargaining power to set the service price. In what follows we discuss the robustness of our results
under more general bargaining procedures in which the two ￿rms share the surplus from service
outsourcing. Recall that, in the OS equilibrium, ￿rm D o⁄ers the maximum acceptable service
price r = ￿ r at which ￿rm F is indi⁄erent between outsourcing the post-production services and
performing the services by itself. We have shown that a tari⁄ reduction increases the equilibrium
service price ￿ r (that is, dr=dt < 0 holds) in a range of parameterizations, and, if dr=dt is su¢ ciently
negative, a tari⁄ reduction hurts consumers and reduces world welfare.
If the two ￿rms share the surplus through bargaining, the equilibrium service price, ^ r, is less than
￿ r and decreasing in ￿rm F￿ s bargaining power. As long as ￿rm D retains su¢ ciently strong bargain-
ing power, d^ r=dt can still be su¢ ciently negative so that a reduction in the tari⁄ harms consumers
and lowers world welfare, and a reduction in K through the liberalization of service FDI converts
the welfare-reducing tari⁄reduction into a welfare-enhancing one. However, as ￿rm D￿ s bargaining
power approaches zero, ￿ r approaches cS and d^ r=dt approaches zero. Hence, when ￿rm D￿ s bargain-
ing power is su¢ ciently close to zero, a tari⁄ reduction does not have the welfare-reducing e⁄ect
and consequently a reduction of K cannot play the role of converting the welfare-reducing trade
liberalization into the welfare-enhancing one. However, as long as ￿rm D￿ s bargaining power is
non-zero, a reduction in K on top of a tari⁄reduction further increases consumer surplus and world
welfare as in Proposition 4, and hence the liberalization of service FDI is still welfare-enhancing.
25Oman has also undertaken similar commitments in its RTA with the US. Many countries which had no GATS
commitments in distribution services, such as Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Morocco, and Nicaragua have undertaken commitments in distribution services in their
RTAs with the US. See Roy et al. (2007) for details.
16Independent service organizations: Our model assumes that post-production services can be
performed only by goods producers (￿rms D and F) because of economy of scope. Alternatively,
suppose that several independent service organizations (ISOs) can also perform post-production
services for ￿rm F at constant marginal cost cS + m. If ￿rm F rejects r o⁄ered by ￿rm D, ￿rm
F determines whether to undertake FDI in post-production services or outsource services to an
ISO. Under the latter option, the game proceeds to an ￿ISO subgame￿ where the equilibrium
service price is given by cS +m. Since outsourcing to an ISO does not weaken the product market
competition, the pro￿t function of each ￿rm in the equilibrium of the ISO subgame coincides with
that in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. Hence, each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t in the subsequent equilibrium
is respectively given by e ￿D(cS + m;t) and e ￿F(cS + m;t).
Suppose m > 0; that is, goods producers have cost advantages over the ISOs in performing
post-production services because of the economy of scope. In this case, there exists a unique ￿ r0
such that b ￿F(￿ r0;t) = e ￿F(cS + m;t) is satis￿ed. Since outsourcing to ￿rm D weakens the degree of
product market competition while outsourcing to the ISOs does not have such an e⁄ect, b ￿F(r;t) >
e ￿F(cS + m;t) holds when the service price is set at r = cS + m. This implies that the maximum
acceptable service price satis￿es ￿ r0 > cS + m. By the same reason, b ￿D(r;t) > e ￿D(cS + m;t) holds
when r = cS + m. Since b ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0, ￿ r0 > cS + m means b ￿D(￿ r0;t) > e ￿D(cS + m;t) holds.
Consequently, ￿rm D o⁄ers r = ￿ r0 and ￿rm F accepts the o⁄er in equilibrium. Hence, even if
outsourcing to an ISO is an option, ￿rm F outsources services to ￿rm D in equilibrium as long as
m > 0 and K > 0 hold. As in the base model, d￿ r0=dt = fe ￿0
F;t(cS +m;t)￿b ￿0
F;t(￿ r0;t)g=b ￿0
F;r(￿ r0;t) < 0
holds in a range of parameterizations. Also, as in Proposition 2, a tari⁄ reduction hurts consumers
and deteriorates world welfare in a range of parameterizations under this alternative setup.26
Now consider the e⁄ects of the liberalization in service FDI given m > 0. A reduction of K
changes the equilibrium service price that ￿rm D charges if it a⁄ects the value of ￿rm F￿ s outside
option, that is, the maximum pro￿t ￿rm F can earn if it rejects the service price ￿rm D o⁄ers. Let
K0 denote the cut-o⁄ level of ￿xed cost determined by e ￿F(cS +m;t) = e ￿F(cS;t)￿K0. If K > K0,
￿rm F￿ s relevant outside option is outsourcing to an ISO rather than an FDI in services since it
chooses the former upon its rejection of r o⁄ered by ￿rm D. Since e ￿F(cS + m;t) is independent
of K, a reduction in K has no e⁄ect as long as K > K0. Once K is su¢ ciently reduced to
satisfy K ￿ K0, however, outsourcing to an ISO is not ￿rm F￿ s relevant outside option any more
because ￿rm F would choose service FDI if it rejects service price r o⁄ered by ￿rm D. This implies
that, when trade the liberalization hurts consumers and reduces world welfare, the liberalization of
service FDI mitigates the negative welfare e⁄ect of tari⁄ reduction and eventually turns it into a
positive e⁄ect in this alternative setup as well. Hence the qualitative nature of our results remains
unchanged in the presence of ISOs as long as m > 0.
Now suppose m < 0. That is, ISOs have a cost advantage over the goods producers in perform-
ing post-production services. Then e ￿F(cS + m;t) > e ￿F(cS;t) ￿ K and e ￿F(cS + m;t) > b ￿F(r;t)
hold for all K ￿ 0 and r ￿ cS, implying that ￿rm F outsources post-production services to an
ISO at the price of cS + m in equilibrium for all K ￿ 0. A tari⁄ reduction does not have negative
welfare impacts, and the liberalization of service FDI plays no roles in this case. Analogous results
hold when m = 0.
Fixed costs for service outsourcing: Firm D incurs no ￿xed costs for performing post-
production services for ￿rm F in our model, and consequently ￿rm D￿ s pro￿t in the equilibrium
26With the linear demand functions, we can verify that d￿ r
0=dt < 0 always holds because e ￿
0




0;t)g > 0 is always satis￿ed.
17of the OS subgame is no less than its pro￿t in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame as long as
r ￿ cS. As a result, ￿rm F undertakes service FDI in the equilibrium of the entire game only if
K = 0. However, ￿xed costs for service outsourcing, such as costs for suitably adjusting ￿rm D￿ s
facilities and learning details on how to e⁄ectively perform services for ￿rm F￿ s product, may often
be non-negligible in reality.
In what follows, we discuss what happens under an alternative setup in which ￿rm D must
incur a ￿xed cost for performing services for ￿rm F.27 As in our base model, the maximum
acceptable service price r satis￿es r > cS when K > 0. However, ￿rm D does not o⁄er r = r in the
equilibrium if its gain from outsourcing, b ￿D (￿ r;t)￿ e ￿D (cS;t), is less than the ￿xed cost for service
outsourcing. Hence, ￿rm F undertakes service FDI in the equilibrium even with K > 0, if ￿rm D￿ s
￿xed cost is su¢ ciently high. Speci￿cally, there exists a unique cut-o⁄value K00 (> 0) such that the
equilibrium of the entire game is the OS equilibrium if K00 < K < K and it is the FDI equilibrium
if 0 ￿ K ￿ K00. Our main results, however, remain mostly unchanged in this alternative setup.
The only di⁄erence is that the conversion from a welfare-reducing trade liberalization to a welfare-
enhancing trade liberalization may not be accomplished when the equilibrium of the game is an OS
equilibrium, since KCS and KWW as de￿ned in Proposition 3 can be smaller than K00. Nonetheless,
the conversion does happen when K is reduced to a su¢ ciently low level.
The assumption of b ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0: We have assumed that b ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0 holds for all r 2 [cS; ￿ r].
If this assumption does not hold, ￿rm D will choose r￿ (￿ ￿ r) such that b ￿0
D;r (r￿;t) = 0 is satis￿ed.
In this case, we can verify that dr￿=dt < 0 can hold, and a tari⁄ reduction hurts consumers and
reduces world welfare under a range of parameterizations as in our base model.28 A reduction of
K has no e⁄ects as long as r￿ < ￿ r holds. Since ￿ r is increasing in K while r￿ is independent of K,
there is a unique cut-o⁄ value K￿ (> 0) such that r￿ ￿ ￿ r holds if K ￿ K￿. Therefore, once K is
reduced below K￿, ￿rm D charges r = r in the equilibrium and the subsequent analysis becomes
identical to the one in the base model.
Two-part tari⁄s for service outsourcing: We have focused on per-unit royalties for service
outsourcing by assuming that ￿rm D o⁄ers a per-unit service price r to perform post-production
services for ￿rm F. In what follows, we discuss what would happen under an alternative setup in
which ￿rm D can o⁄er a two-part tari⁄ (R;r) where R (￿ 0) denotes a ￿xed fee and r denotes a
per-unit royalty. In the OS equilibrium, ￿rm D chooses (R;r) to maximize its pro￿t b ￿D(r;t) + R
subject to b ￿F(r;t)￿R = e ￿F(cS;t)￿K. That is, ￿rm D chooses (R;r) so that ￿rm F is indi⁄erent
between outsourcing services and performing them by itself. Let R(r) = b ￿F(r;t)￿fe ￿F(cS;t)￿Kg
be the maximum ￿xed fee that ￿rm D can charge and let e r be the solution of b ￿0
D;r(r;t)+@R(r)=@r =
b ￿0
D;r(r;t) + b ￿0
F;r(r;t) = 0. Since an increase in r has a strategic e⁄ect that increases pD and pF
and bene￿ts both ￿rms, the service price that maximizes the joint pro￿t of the two ￿rms satis￿es
e r > cS.
Let e K be the ￿xed cost which satis￿es R(e r) = 0. If K is high enough to satisfy K > e K,
￿rm D o⁄ers (R;r) = (R(e r);e r) in the equilibrium where R(e r) > 0 and e r < r hold. In this case,
de r=dt < 0 can hold and a tari⁄ reduction hurts consumers and lowers world welfare under a range
of parameterizations as in our base model.29 As for the liberalization of service FDI, a reduction
27We obtain qualitatively the same result when ￿rm F shares the ￿xed cost of service outsourcing with ￿rm D.
28Under the linear demand system, for instance, dr
￿=dt < 0 holds if cS is su¢ ciently small.
29Suppose that the demand function for good i is linear and given by xi(pi;pj) = a￿pi +bpj (i;j 2 fD;Fg; i 6= j)
as in footnote 22. Since ￿D￿￿F = e r(4￿b
2)=f(3+t)
￿
2 + 2t + b
2￿
g > 0, min[￿D;￿F] = ￿F. By Proposition 2, a tari⁄
18of K reduces R(e r) but it does not a⁄ect e r when K > e K. If K is reduced to satisfy K ￿ e K, on
the other hand, R(e r) = 0 holds and it is optimal for ￿rm D to set r = r. That is, ￿rm D o⁄ers
(R;r) = (0;r) in the equilibrium if K ￿ ~ K. Hence, a reduction of K to a su¢ ciently low level
below ~ K converts a welfare-reducing trade liberalization into welfare-enhancing one as in our base
model. The qualitative nature of our main results, therefore, would remain unchanged under this
alternative setup that incorporates two-part tari⁄s for service outsourcing.
Trade liberalization with endogenous FDI costs: We have explored the e⁄ects of the lib-
eralization of goods trade and service FDI by treating the tari⁄ rate and the ￿xed cost of service
FDI as exogenous variables. As discussed in the Introduction, many countries have committed to
maintaining low tari⁄ rates under GATT/WTO multilateral agreements. Consequently, for many
countries it is no longer possible to use tari⁄s as ￿ exible policy instruments to enhance domestic
welfare. In contrast, concerning service FDI, the limited progress of GATS means that countries
can still manipulate the in￿ ows of service FDI by raising the levels of regulatory impediments (see
footnote 7). We can investigate the e⁄ects of trade liberalization (a reduction of tari⁄ rate from
t0 to t1) with endogenous FDI costs by assuming that the domestic government chooses K to
maximize domestic welfare under the exogenously given level of tari⁄ rate t.
Suppose that, before Stage 1, the domestic government chooses the level of K at Stage 0,
taking the tari⁄ rate t as given. Let K￿(t) denote the ￿xed cost of service FDI that the domestic
government chooses to maximize domestic welfare, which is uniquely determined in the equilibrium.
We can show that there exists a range of parameterizations in which the domestic government
chooses K￿(t0) > 0 and K￿(t1) > 0, and CS(K￿(t1);t1) < CS(K￿(t0);t0) and WW(K￿(t1);t1) <
WW(K￿(t0);t0) hold where 0 ￿ t1 < t0. This means that consumer surplus and world welfare can
be decreased even if the domestic government can optimally adjust the level of K. An intuitive
explanation is as follows. In response to the tari⁄ reduction, the domestic government changes K
from K￿(t0) to K￿(t1) to maximize domestic welfare. Proposition 4 tells us that, holding the tari⁄
rate ￿xed, the equilibrium consumer surplus is decreasing in K while ￿rm D￿ s equilibrium pro￿t
is increasing in K. We also ￿nd that the equilibrium tari⁄ revenue can be either increasing or
decreasing in (or a non-monotone function of) K. Hence the relationship between domestic welfare
and K is ambiguous, and it depends on parameterizations.30 We can verify that the domestic
government may increase K in response to the tari⁄ reduction, or may decrease it but not to a
low enough level that guarantees welfare-improving tari⁄ reductions.31 In such cases, the tari⁄
reduction could hurt consumers and decrease world welfare. Under such a situation, by forcing
the domestic government to reduce K, multilateral negotiations such as GATS can increase world
welfare as well as consumer surplus, and convert the welfare-reducing trade liberalization into the
welfare-enhancing one. Hence, endogenizing FDI costs do not change the qualitative nature of our
results.
More than one domestic ￿rm: We have analyzed the strategic interaction between ￿rms D


















holds, (@e r=@t) < min[￿D;￿F] is satis￿ed if the initial tari⁄, t, is su¢ ciently small. Hence, even if two-part tari⁄s for
service outsourcing are considered, a tari⁄ reduction increases the service price, hurts consumer surplus, and reduces
world welfare under a range of parameterizations.
30In international oligopoly models, any policy that increases foreign ￿rms￿operation costs generates strategic
e⁄ects that cause rent-shifting, and hence such a policy tends to result in ambiguous welfare e⁄ects in each country.
31The formal analysis is provided in another version of the paper (Ishikawa et al., 2008).
19and F by assuming that only one ￿rm can produce the ￿nal good in the domestic country. One
can consider an alternative setup in which N (￿ 2) symmetric domestic ￿rms, indexed by D1,
D2, ..., DN, produce di⁄erentiated products. In the presence of more than one domestic ￿rm, the
qualitative nature of our main results remains unchanged if ￿rm F negotiates prices for service
outsourcing with one domestic ￿rm at a time in a sequential fashion. In particular, suppose that
￿rm F ￿rst negotiates with ￿rm D1 on service prices, and, if ￿rm F decides not to outsource services
to ￿rm D1, then ￿rm F performs services by itself with service FDI or negotiates with ￿rm D2, and
so on.32 In the product-market competition stage, N+1 ￿rms compete in a Bertrand fashion under
di⁄erentiated oligopoly. The alternative model has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, which is
an FDI equilibrium or an OS equilibrium, depending on parameterizations. In the OS equilibrium,
the equilibrium service price ^ r can increase as the tari⁄ is reduced, and our main comparative
statics results hold under a range of parameterizations.
Alternatively, suppose that domestic ￿rms simultaneously o⁄er service prices, and ￿rm F ac-
cepts one of the o⁄ers or rejects all o⁄ers. If domestic ￿rms have di⁄erent per-unit costs for
performing post-production services for ￿rm F, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which
a domestic ￿rm o⁄ers r = ￿ r when the domestic ￿rm￿ s cost is substantially lower than the other
domestic ￿rms￿costs.33
Non-tari⁄ barriers: Since a tari⁄ is a pure transfer from ￿rm F to the domestic government,
a reduction in t does not directly a⁄ect world welfare. Hence, a tari⁄ reduction deteriorates
world welfare whenever it increases both prices of goods D and F. We can interpret t as a proxy
for non-tari⁄ barriers rather than a tari⁄. Then, a reduction in t results in the saving of real
costs, which directly works in favor of world welfare. In this case, a reduction in t may improve
world welfare even if it increases both prices of the goods. Nevertheless, it can be shown that
@WW(K;t)=@t > 0 can hold under a range of parameterizations, and hence Propositions 2 and 3
hold under the alternative interpretation of t.34
Speci￿c tari⁄: We have considered ad valorem tari⁄s, given their prevalence in the real world.
In the case of speci￿c tari⁄s, the burden of a tari⁄ is proportional to the amount of sales, xF,
rather than to the revenue, pFxF. Hence, the ￿rst-term of the RHS of (14) representing the direct
e⁄ect is replaced by b xF(r;t) ￿ e xF(cS;t) in the case of speci￿c tari⁄s. Since service outsourcing
to ￿rm D weakens the degree of product-market competition, b xF(r;t) > e xF(cS;t) could hold. In
this case, dr=dt < 0 holds if b xF(r;t)￿ e xF(cS;t) is su¢ ciently positive, and a tari⁄ reduction could
hurt consumers and enhance world welfare. Under linear demands, however, we can verify that
b xF(r;t)￿e xF(cS;t) < 0 always holds, and it outweighs the strategic e⁄ect. Hence, dr=dt > 0 always
holds with both speci￿c tari⁄s and linear demands.
Cournot competition: Consider an alternative setup in which ￿rms compete against each other
by choosing quantities. Suppose that, in an OS subgame, ￿rm D increases the quantity of good
32The sequential setup can be regarded as approximating the following scenario, which we feel is fairly realistic.
When a foreign ￿rm attempts to outsource post-production services to one of its domestic rivals, the foreign ￿rm
needs to identify a candidate ￿rm by incurring search costs, and negotiate the terms of service outsourcing with the
candidate. If the negotiation is unsuccessful, the ￿rm will identify another candidate to negotiate with.
33If domestic ￿rms must incur a ￿xed cost in providing services, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium when
domestic ￿rms have the identical per-unit cost (see Sharkey and Sibley, 1993). Each ￿rm chooses the probability
of o⁄ering service prices in a mixed strategy equilibrium, and the case in which only one ￿rm o⁄ers the maximum
acceptable service price r = r remains an equilibrium with a positive probability.
34In a related work, Sanna-Randaccio (1996) analyzes the e⁄ects of a removal of non-tari⁄ barriers when an FDI
in goods production is endogenously determined.
20D, holding the quantity of good F ￿xed. This does not a⁄ect ￿rm D￿ s pro￿t from performing
post-production services for ￿rm F, (r ￿ cS)xF, since the quantity of good F is ￿xed. Under
Bertrand competition, on the other hand, an increase in the price of good D, holding the price of
good F ￿xed, increases (r ￿cS)xF, because it increases xF. That is, unlike Bertrand competition,
Cournot competition does not capture the idea that, although ￿rm D can increase the sales of its
own product by adopting a more aggressive strategy, such a strategy also reduces its pro￿t from
performing services for its rival ￿rm.
The di⁄erence mentioned above plays an important role in the determination of the sign of
dr=dt. Recall Lemma 3 and the discussion presented right after the lemma. In the equilibrium of
the OS subgame with the service price r = ￿ r, ￿rm F￿ s unit cost of production is ￿ r, which is greater
than its unit cost cS in the equilibrium of the FDI subgame. The higher unit cost works in the
direction of making ￿rm F￿ s revenue smaller in the equilibrium of the OS subgame. This e⁄ect
exists in the model under Cournot competition as well. In the model with Bertrand competition,
there is another e⁄ect to be considered. That is, service outsourcing induces ￿rm D to charge a
higher price to goods D so that ￿rm F can sell more, because ￿rm D can make pro￿t from selling
services to ￿rm F. This e⁄ect works in the direction of making ￿rm F￿ s revenue greater in the
equilibrium of the OS subgame. As mentioned above, the second e⁄ect does not exist in the model
with Cournot competition. This implies that the direct e⁄ect captured by the ￿rst term of the RHS
of (14) is negative.35 Then dr=dt < 0 holds only if the strategic e⁄ect is positive and su¢ ciently
large to overshadow the direct e⁄ect. With linear demands, we can verify that the second-term
is positive but not large enough to overshadow the direct e⁄ect, implying that dr=dt ￿ 0 always
holds under Cournot competition with linear demands.36
5. Conclusion
Post-production services such as sales, distribution, and maintenance consist of an important
subclass of services. Although the liberalization of the trade in goods has made substantial progress
through multilateral negotiations under GATT/WTO, the progress of the liberalization in the
service sector has been limited so far. In this paper, we have uncovered a previously unnoticed
importance of the liberalization in the service sector by exploring an international duopoly model
that captures the linkage between product market competition and provision of post-production
services. That is, we have found that the trade liberalization of goods may have negative welfare
e⁄ects if it is not accompanied by the liberalization of service FDI.
The trade liberalization reduces trade costs, and this intensi￿es competition between a foreign
￿rm and a domestic ￿rm in the product market. At the same time, when the foreign ￿rm outsources
35In the case of Cournot competition, the equation analogous to (14) is
e ￿
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where the ￿rst term captures the direct e⁄ect and the second term captures the strategic e⁄ect.
36Under quantity competition with linear demands, the second e⁄ect still exists if ￿rm D acts as a Stackelberg
leader, and dr=dt < 0 is possible in this case.
21post-production services, the trade liberalization may induce the domestic ￿rm to charge a higher
service price to absorb a part of the foreign ￿rm￿ s incremental pro￿t due to lower trade costs. We
have demonstrated that, if the foreign ￿rm￿ s ￿xed cost of service FDI is relatively high, the latter
negative welfare e⁄ect may overshadow the former positive one so that the trade liberalization
harms consumers and lowers world welfare in a range of parameterizations. Importantly, this
negative welfare e⁄ect of the trade liberalization is mitigated and eventually turned into a positive
one as service FDI is also liberalized. This is because a reduction in the ￿xed cost of service FDI
decreases the price of service outsourcing that the foreign ￿rm would accept.
Our analysis has therefore indicated that the liberalization of service FDI is important not only
because it reduces per-unit costs of post-production services but also because it recovers gains from
the trade liberalization in goods for both consumers and world welfare. Making progress on the
liberalization of service FDI under GATS is crucial to secure positive welfare consequences of the
trade liberalization under GATT/WTO.
We o⁄er two ￿nal remarks to conclude the paper. First, we comment on the di⁄erence between
post-production services and intermediate inputs in our framework. In our international duopoly
model, the foreign ￿rm has an option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival
or performing the services by itself in the domestic market. Since we focus on a class of post-
production services that are indispensable for the consumption of goods, it is possible to consider
a model with an analogous logical structure in which post-production services are replaced by
intermediate inputs. For example, one can consider a foreign ￿rm that does not have the facilities
to produce an intermediate input, and can suppose that the foreign ￿rm determines whether it
procures the intermediate input from its domestic rival or produces the input by building its own
production facilities.37
A critical di⁄erence between our model and the alternative model with intermediate inputs is
the role played by the liberalization of service FDI and its connection to the liberalization of trade
in goods. Since intermediate inputs are not services but goods, service FDI has no direct e⁄ects
on the foreign ￿rm￿ s make-or-buy decision in the alternative model. In contrast, the liberalization
of service FDI plays a critical role in our framework. That is, in order to perform post-production
services, the foreign ￿rm needs to undertake service FDI and establish its own service facilities in
the ￿domestic￿market. In our analysis, the connection between production and post-production
services has yielded a novel policy implication that the trade liberalization should be accompanied
by the liberalization of service FDI to secure its positive welfare e⁄ects. The recent progress of
the trade liberalization is not yet accompanied by the su¢ cient progress of the liberalization of
service FDI, and this reality has motivated us to study the connection between production and
post-production services in international contexts. Also, since the trade liberalization of goods
a⁄ects the intermediate-good market as well as the ￿nal-good market, policy implications of the
trade liberalization may be di⁄erent between the model with intermediate inputs and the model
with post-production services.
Second, given that imperfect competition in the product market is an important element of
our analysis, one may argue that strengthening product market competition could be a substitute
37To the best of our knowledge, international oligopoly models with intermediate inputs as mentioned above (in
which a ￿rm decides whether or not to establish its own facilities to produce intermediate inputs) have not been
previously explored. Chen et al. (2004) presented a related analysis, but ￿rms have their own facilities to produce
intermediate inputs in their model. The focus of their analysis is the comparison between the e⁄ect of the trade
liberalization of intermediate goods and the e⁄ect of the trade liberalization of ￿nal goods.
22for liberalizing service FDI. Suppose that the domestic government has stimulated competition
in the product market by inducing ￿rms￿entry, and consequently there are N (￿ 2) domestic
￿rms. As we discussed in Subsection 4.2, the liberalization of service FDI can still be critical in
recovering gains from the trade liberalization of goods, as long as the price for service outsourcing
is determined by one-to-one negotiations. Also, although the domestic government could induce
the entry of some independent service organizations, the liberalization of service FDI could still be
critical as discussed in Subsection 4.2.
There are several directions of related research that are left for future work. One direction
concerns the nature of post-production services. That is, although we have focused on a class of
post-production services that are indispensable for the consumption of goods but do not a⁄ect
the demand for goods, it is also important to consider another class of post-production services
such as marketing and repair services that a⁄ect the demand for goods. Also, another promising
direction of future research seems to be empirical works that investigate the relationship between
trade liberalization in goods and liberalization in service sectors.38
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Appendix A.1. Proof of Lemma 1

















The second-order su¢ cient conditions of pro￿t maximization require @2￿i=(@pi)2 < 0 (i = fD;Fg)
and ￿ ￿ f@2￿D=(@pD)2gf@2￿F=(@pF)2g ￿ f@￿D=(@pF@pD)gf@￿F=(@pD@pF)g > 0. Since we con-
sider the case where the price settings of the two ￿rms are strategic complements, @2￿i=(@pj@pi) > 0
38By using EU data, Francois et al. (2009) ￿nd that the impact of the border price changes on consumer prices,
which are partly induced by tari⁄ changes, varies substantially across EU countries. They suggest that the variation
of price impact is associated with the market structure in the retail and distribution sectors.
23(i 6= j) holds. We assume
￿
￿@2￿i=(@pi)2￿
￿ > @2￿i=(@pj@pi) to ensure the uniqueness of the equilib-






































Since CS(pD;pF) and WW(pD;pF) are decreasing in each price, an increase in the service price
reduces both consumer surplus and world welfare.
Appendix A.2. The condition for ^ ￿
0
F;r < 0


































is satis￿ed, because @xF=@pF < 0 and j@xF=@pFj > j@xF=@pDj. If @pF=@r > 1 holds, on the other
hand, it is known from (A.2) that @pF=@r becomes smaller as @xF=@pD becomes smaller. Besides
that, given @pF=@r being constant, b ￿0
F;r(r;t) < 0 holds if @xF=@pD is su¢ ciently small. In this
case, therefore, b ￿0
F;r(r;t) < 0 holds if @xF=@pD is su¢ ciently small.
Appendix A.3. Proof of Lemma 4






























Since @b pi(r;t)=@r > 0 is also satis￿ed, ￿i (i = D;F) is always negative.
24Appendix A.4. Proof of Proposition 2
We ￿rst note that consumer surplus and world welfare are decreasing in both pD and pF, and
that changes in t and r a⁄ect consumer surplus and world welfare only through the induced changes
in pD and pF. With respect to ￿D, it is increasing in pD, pF, and r, while t a⁄ects ￿D only through
its induced e⁄ects on the goods prices. In view of Lemma 4, if dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F](< 0) holds and a
tari⁄reduction increases both goods prices (@pD=@t < 0 and @pF=@t < 0), then @CS(K;t)=@t > 0,
@CS(K;t)=@t > 0, and @￿D(K;t)=@t < 0 always hold. Conversely, if @CS(K;t)=@t > 0 and
@WW(K;t)=@t > 0 hold, it is necessary that a tari⁄ reduction increases at least one of the goods
prices. Lemma 4 suggests that @pD=@t < 0 or @pF=@t < 0 holds only if dr=dt < max[￿D;￿F]
holds. With respect to @￿D(K;t)=@t, it can be negative even if dr=dt ￿ max[￿D;￿F] holds, since
an increase in the service price caused by a tari⁄ reduction directly increases the pro￿t of ￿rm D.
To prove that dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F] can hold under a range of parameterizations, we provide a
numerical example with linear demands. We consider a speci￿c form of the subutility function given
by V (pD;pF) = V ￿a(pD + pF)+f(pF)
2+(pD)
2g=2￿bpDpF where V is a positive constant. With
this function, the demand function for good i is derived as xi(pD;pF) = a￿pi+bpj (i;j 2 fD;Fg;
i 6= j) where a (> 0) and b 2 [0;1) respectively represent the market size and the substitutability
of the two products. As b gets closer to one, similarity between the two products increases. With
the linear demand functions, we can verify that b ￿0
F;r(r;t) < 0 always holds. We can also calculate





2 + 2t + b2￿
g < 0. Hence, to prove dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F] can
hold, it is su¢ cient to prove dr=dt < ￿F holds under a range of parameterizations. Suppose a = 10,
b = 0:9, cS = 1, t = 0:1, and K0 = 4. Then with these parameterizations, the sales of good F is
positive, ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0 holds for all r 2 (cS; ￿ r], K0 < K is satis￿ed, and @WW(pD;pF)=@pD < 0
and @WW(pD;pF)=@pF < 0 hold. We can calculate that b pF(r;t)b xF(r;t) ￿ e pF(cS;t)e xF(cS;t) ￿
10:579 at K = K0, which means that the ￿rst-term of (14) is positive. Although the second term
of (14) is negative, the ￿rst term outweighs it and we have e ￿0
F;t (cS;t)￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t) ￿ 5:5996. Using
b ￿0
F;r (r;t) ￿ ￿2:4783, we obtain dr=dt ￿ ￿2:2595. Since dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F] = ￿F ￿ ￿1:7218,
holding K ￿xed at K0, @CS(K0;t)=@t > 0, @CS(K0;t)=@t > 0, and @￿D(K0;t)=@t < 0 hold.
Appendix A.5. Proof of Lemma 5
Di⁄erentiating b ￿F (r;t) = e ￿F (cS;t)￿K with respect to r and K, we have dr=dK = ￿fb ￿0
F;r (r;t)g￿1 >
0.
Appendix A.6. Proof of Proposition 3
From (14), e ￿0
F;t (cS;t0) ￿ b ￿0
F;t (r;t0) = 0 if r = cS. Besides that, b ￿0
F;r (r;t0) < 0 holds for all
r ￿ cS. Hence, by (13), dr=dt = 0 at r = cS. Furthermore, in view of (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and
(A.4), @b pi(r;t0)=@r > 0 and @b pi(r;t0)=@t > 0 are satis￿ed for all r ￿ cS and thereby ￿i < 0 always
holds. Consequently, we can always ￿nd a unique value b r > 0 such that dr=dt = max[￿D;￿F] holds
for r = b r and dr=dt > max[￿D;￿F] holds for all r < b r. By Lemma 5, a reduction of K decreases
r, which implies that we can always ￿nd b K > 0 such that dr=dt = max[￿D;￿F] holds for K = b K
and dr=dt > max[￿D;￿F] holds for all K < b K.
For K ￿ b K, we have @CS (K;t0)=@t < 0 and @WW (K;t0)=@t < 0, because a tari⁄ reduction
never increases the goods prices. If @CS (K;t0)=@t > 0 and @WW (K;t0)=@t > 0 hold for some
K, then such K must satisfy K > b K. This means that there exist a unique KCS ￿ b K > 0 such
25that @CS(K;t0)=@t < 0 holds for all K 2 (0;KCS), and a unique KWW ￿ b K > 0 such that
@WW(K;t0)=@t < 0 holds for all K 2 (0;KWW).39
Appendix A.7. Proof of Proposition 4
By Lemma 5, a reduction of K decreases r. By Lemma 1, consumer surplus and world welfare
are decreasing in r holding t ￿xed. A reduction of K also directly improves world welfare holding
r ￿xed. With respect to each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, since b ￿0
D;r (r;t) > 0 and b ￿0
F;r (r;t) < 0 hold, b ￿D (r;t)
is increasing in r and b ￿F (r;t) is decreasing in r holding t ￿xed. Consequently, for any given t,
CS(K;t), WW(K;t), and ￿F(K;t) are decreasing in K, while ￿D(K;t) is increasing in K.
Appendix A.8. Proof of Proposition 5
























A change in t a⁄ects consumer surplus, world welfare, and ￿rm D￿ s pro￿t only through tari⁄-
induced changes in e pD and e pF. By the envelope theorem, we have @e ￿D(cS;t)=@t = [e pD ￿
cS](@e xD=@pF)(@e pF=@t) > 0. Since consumer surplus and world welfare are decreasing in both
e pD and e pF, @CS (K;t)=@t < 0, @￿D (K;t)=@t > 0, and @WW (K;t)=@t < 0 hold at K = 0.
Appendix A.9. The welfare results with @WW(pD;pF)=@pi > 0
We have considered the case where both @WW(pD;pF)=@pD < 0 and WW(pD;pF)=@pF < 0
hold in equilibrium. In what follows, we show that the results of the paper remain mostly unchanged
when ￿i ￿ @WW(pD;pF)=@pi > 0 (i = D; or F) holds in equilibrium (see footnote 18). More
speci￿cally, results concerning world welfare presented in Lemma 1, Propositions 2 and 4 need
some adjustments, while all other results presented in lemmas and propositions remain unchanged.



















Since e pF (cS;0) = e pD (cS;0) holds, (23) implies that e pF (cS;t) ￿ e pD (cS;t) always holds. This in
turn means that ￿F < 0 always holds, while ￿D ￿ 0 holds if
e pD(cS;t)￿cS
e pF(cS;t)￿cS ￿ ￿
(@e xF=@pD)
(@e xD=@pD) and ￿D < 0
holds otherwise. Note that ￿D + ￿F < 0 always holds. The e⁄ects of an increase in t on world
welfare in the FDI equilibrium can be expressed as




















39For instance, if we use the same linear demand functions and the same parameters used in the proof of Proposition
2, we obtain b K ￿ 0:74085; K
CS ￿ 1:35956, and K
WW ￿ 1:43663:
26>From (A.7), even if ￿D ￿ 0 holds, we have @WW (e pD; e pF)=@t < 0. Hence, Proposition 5 remains
unchanged when @WW(pD;pF)=@pi > 0 (i = D; or F) holds.
















































Under the linear demand system, xi(pD;pF) = a ￿ pi + bpj (i;j 2 fD;Fg; i 6= j), we can verify
that @b pF(r;t)=@r ￿ @b pD(r;t)=@r > 0 always holds. Under non-linear demands, @b pF(r;t)=@r ￿
@b pD(r;t)=@r > 0 holds if the magnitude of the cross price e⁄ect of good F, @b xF=@pD, is su¢ ciently
smaller than that of the own price e⁄ect, j@b xF=@pFj.
Suppose @b pF(r;t)=@r ￿ @b pD(r;t)=@r > 0 holds. Since b pD(cS;0) = b pF(cS;0) and r ￿ cS hold,
(A.8) implies that we have b pF(r;t) ￿ b pD(r;t) in equilibrium. This means that ￿F < 0 always holds
while ￿D is either positive or negative. Note that ￿D + ￿F < 0 always holds. Holding t ￿xed, the
e⁄ects of an increase in r on world welfare in the OS equilibrium can be expressed as




















Hence, even if ￿D > 0, @WW (b pD; b pF)=@r < 0 always holds in this case. This means that Lemma 1
and Proposition 4 remain unchanged. Alternatively, suppose @b pF(r;t)=@r￿@b pD(r;t)=@r < 0 holds.
In this case, b pF(r;t) < b pD(r;t) may hold if t is small and r is large. If b pF(r;t) < b pD(r;t) holds,
￿D < 0 holds while ￿F can be either positive or negative. Even if ￿F > 0, however, ￿D+￿F < 0 and
(A.9) implies that @WW (b pD; b pF)=@r < 0 always holds. Hence, Lemma 1 and Proposition 4 remain
unchanged. Only in the special case where @b pF(r;t)=@r ￿ @b pD(r;t)=@r < 0, b pF(r;t) > b pD(r;t),
and ￿D > 0 are satis￿ed at the same time, the possibility of @WW (b pD; b pF)=@r > 0 cannot be
ruled out and hence WW (K;t) is not necessarily decreasing in K for all K 2 (0;K], although
WW (K;t) is decreasing in K when K is small enough. This means that results concerning world
welfare presented in Lemma 1 and Proposition 4 needs some adjustments in this special case.
Regarding Proposition 2, when ￿i > 0 (i = D; or F) holds, @WW(K0;t)=@t > 0 may not
hold even when dr=dt < min[￿D;￿F] holds. However, @WW(K0;t)=@t > 0 holds under a range of
parameterizations (for instance, if the parameters are set at a = 10, b = 0:99, cS = 1, t = 0:1, and
K0 = 2:5 under the linear demand system, we have ￿D = 0:012444 and @WW(K0;t)=@t = 4:4312),
and in this sense the qualitative nature of Proposition 2 remains unchanged.
We have shown that @WW(e pD; e pF)=@t < 0 holds in the FDI equilibrium irrespective of the
sign of ￿i. If K is su¢ ciently reduced so that r is su¢ ciently close to cS, dr=dt becomes close to
zero and b pD and b pF approaches e pD and e pF respectively. This means that @WW (b pD; b pF)=@t ￿
@WW(e pD; e pF)=@t < 0 holds if K is su¢ ciently reduced. Hence, Proposition 3 remains unchanged
when ￿i > 0 (i = D; or F) holds.
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28Figure 1
Determination of the service price
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